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INTRODUCTION 
Most courts, legislatures, and scholars agree that the widespread 
movement over the past half-century toward aligning liability with fault has 
positively influenced tort law;1 however, the change has not come without 
difficulty.2 Courts and legislatures have struggled to determine how these 
developing doctrines affect apportionment of damages in various contexts.3 
This note addresses the issue of how damages should be apportioned among 
multiple tortfeasors when an injured plaintiff has suffered a workplace 
injury and the employer or a coworker is partially to blame. In certain 
situations, workers’ compensation laws undercut the principles of 
comparative fault by requiring a non-immune defendant to compensate an 
injured worker greater than the defendant’s percentage of fault, while a 
blameworthy but immune employer is reimbursed in full.4 
An example illustrates the problem: Eddy Employee and Carl 
Coworker work together at Employer Co. While on the job, Eddy is riding 
as a passenger in a work vehicle driven by Carl, and they are involved in a 
car wreck with Driver. As a result of the accident, Eddy is severely injured 
and later receives $20,000 in workers’ compensation benefits from 
Employer Co. (likely paid by its workers’ compensation insurance carrier). 
Eddy then sues Driver seeking $200,000 in damages. The crux of the 
problem is that even if Carl was negligent in the operation of the vehicle as 
a coworker he is given immunity from fault allocation under the workers’ 
compensation laws, as would the employer. Further, since Eddy was just a 
passenger and did not in any way cause the car accident, there is no fault to 
allege against him as the plaintiff. 
In every state, workers’ compensation laws create an arrangement 
where an employer pays limited benefits to an employee injured on the job 
in exchange for the employer’s immunity to tort liability.5 This immunity 
also extends to coworkers in the majority of states.6 As in the example 
                                                
 1. COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE MANUAL 3D § 1:2 (1995). 
 2. See generally Michael D. Green, The Unanticipated Ripples of Comparative 
Negligence: Superseding Cause in Products Liability and Beyond, 53 S.C. L. REV. 1103 
(2002). 
 3. Andrew R. Klein, Apportionment of Liability in Workplace Injury Cases, 
26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 65, 66 (2005). 
 4. Id. at 66–67. 
 5. LARSON’S WORKERS COMPENSATION LAW § 1.01 (2014). 
 6. Id. § 111.03. 
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above, however, another party may have contributed to the employee’s 
harm. Under the traditional approach, used in the majority of states, 
workers’ compensation laws also preclude consideration of an employer’s 
fault in the context of litigation involving an injured employee against a 
third-party defendant for a workplace injury,7 including the fault of any of 
the employer’s employees.8 In neither situation can fault be allocated to the 
employer or coworker for their negligence, so the only fault considered is 
that of the plaintiff and the third-party defendant.9 Even if the coworker or 
employer was substantially more at fault than the third-party defendant, the 
jury cannot consider this in its fault allocation.10 Therefore, if at trial the 
jury finds Driver to be at fault, no matter what the percentage, then Driver, 
a non-immune defendant who was only partially at fault for Eddy’s injury, 
will have to bear liability both for his own fault and that of Eddy’s 
negligent coworker Carl. 
Further, after the injured worker recovers from the third-party 
defendant, the immune employer typically has the right to recover in 
subrogation the full amount of workers’ compensation benefits paid to the 
injured employee.11 It is said that the employer’s right to subrogation 
ensures that the injured worker is not permitted to recover twice, through 
both workers’ compensation benefits and a tort award, and it is generally 
deemed justifiable when the employer is permitted to recover from the only 
party to blame for the injury.12 But the right to recover through subrogation 
exists regardless of whether the employer or one if its employees were at 
fault.13 Thus, assuming Eddy prevails at establishing some fault of Driver 
and recovers $200,000, Employer Co. (or its insurance carrier) has the right 
to pursue its subrogation lien for the $20,000 that it paid previously in 
workers’ compensation benefits. Since workers’ compensation laws permit 
this, the employer recovers this amount regardless of the fact that its 
employee Carl was also negligent and arguably should have shared in the 
fault allocation. 
This concerning result conflicts with the routine practice of courts, 
which is to use prevalent comparative fault principles to make calculations 
that align liability with fault. If courts are able to adjust damage awards 
                                                
 7. Id. § 120.02; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY 
§ C20(a)(ii) & cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2000). 
 8. LARSON’S WORKERS COMPENSATION LAW § 120.02 (2014). 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. § 121.09. 
 12. See, e.g., Struhs v. Protection Techs., Inc., 992 P.2d 164, 168 (Idaho 1999) 
(quoting Presnell v. Kelly, 740 P.2d 43, 45 (Idaho 1987)) (“The dual purposes of 
subrogation . . . are to achieve an equitable distribution between responsible parties ‘by 
assuring that the discharge of an obligation be paid by the person who in equity and good 
conscience ought to pay it’ and ‘to prevent the injured claimant from obtaining a double 
recovery for an injury.’”). 
 13. LARSON’S WORKERS COMPENSATION LAW § 121.09 (2014). 
262 BELMONT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3: 259 
based on each tortfeasor’s contribution to the harm, then a nonimmune 
third-party defendant should not be forced to compensate an injured 
plaintiff greater than his percentage of fault and an employer should not be 
fully reimbursed for workers’ compensation payments when the employer 
or its employee was to blame for the harm. However, it must be considered 
that the individual interests of three separate parties are at play. The law 
must seek to accommodate the injured employee’s interest in full 
compensation for his harm, the employer’s interests in limited liability and 
subrogation, and the third-party defendant’s interest in a reduced liability 
that is in proportion to his own fault. Although it appears that no perfect 
solution is possible, a solution in which each of the parties bears a portion 
of the burden of inequity created by the inability to neatly mesh workers’ 
compensation and tort law is attainable. 
In support of this conclusion, Part I of this note describes the 
background principles of comparative fault and workers’ compensation 
law, which led to the problem of meshing the two systems in an injured 
employee’s suit against a third-party defendant. Using the Eddy Employee 
example from above as a guide, Part II examines the differing results 
produced by existing approaches that address the concurrent negligence of 
an employer or coworker, and Part III analyzes various solutions suggested 
by scholars for the apportionment of liability in such workplace injury 
cases. Finally, after considering these varied approaches, Part IV lays out a 
new proposed solution, discusses the problems with the current approaches 
and suggested solutions in light of widespread acceptance of the alignment 
of fault and liability, and explains why the new proposal improves upon the 
other approaches in this regard. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Negligence Suits and Movement Towards Principles of Comparative 
Fault 
The central task of tort law is to remedy accidental harms,14 and the 
tort of negligence is said to lie at the heart of civil liability,15 as most 
accidents, professional malpractice, and personal injury cases, are governed 
by the common law of negligence.16 While negligence law varies from state 
to state, a plaintiff must generally prove the following elements: (1) the 
defendant owed the plaintiff a legal duty; (2) the defendant breached that 
legal duty by behaving negligently; (3) the plaintiff suffered actual damage; 
and (4) the defendant’s behavior was an actual and proximate cause of that 
                                                
 14. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TORTS 69 (1999). 
 15. JOHN L. DIAMOND ET AL., UNDERSTANDING TORTS 45 (4th ed. 2010). 
 16. EPSTEIN, supra note 14, at 109. 
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damage.17 According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, “negligence is 
conduct which falls below the standard established by law for the protection 
of others against unreasonable risk of harm,”18 and the Restatement (Third) 
of Torts indicates that conduct is considered negligent if the actor does not 
exercise reasonable care.19 Either definition may apply, but in all 
jurisdictions the tort of negligence requires blameworthy conduct, or fault.20 
Development of tort law has revolved, in part, around this concept of fault, 
as the law tends to disfavor liability without fault, and specifically around 
the apportionment of fault.21 
When the conduct of multiple parties can be said to have caused a 
particular indivisible harm, it creates the question of how to divide 
responsibility for damages among the parties, including both plaintiffs and 
defendants.22 An indivisible harm can be described as a single injury a 
plaintiff sustains as a result of successive acts of negligence by more than 
one tortfeasor.23 Each tortfeasor’s negligent act works together to bring 
about the injury,24 such as when one driver who was speeding and another 
who was sending a text message both crash into the plaintiff’s car.25 If the 
plaintiff emerges with a back injury as a result of the combined impact, the 
injury could be considered an indivisible harm.26 The rules of fault 
apportionment, predominately developed over the past several decades, 
address this issue.27 As discussed in the following sections, the vast 
majority of jurisdictions now recognize at least some form of comparative 
fault, which has made a major impact on existing common law methods of 
apportionment, or the lack thereof. 
1. Contributory Negligence 
Contributory negligence is a common affirmative defense to a 
claim of negligence.28 In raising the defense of contributory negligence, the 
defendant asserts that the plaintiff also behaved negligently, and, therefore, 
                                                
 17. Robert Cary, Torts: Playing the Blame Game: The Division of Fault Between 
Negligent Parties in Minnesota–Daly v. McFarland, 39 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 275, 277 
(2012). 
 18. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
 19. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT LIABILITY § 4, cmt. a (AM. 
LAW INST. 2000). 
 20. See DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 122 (2d ed. 2011). 
 21. See generally id. at § 487. 
 22. Id. 
 23. EPSTEIN, supra note 14, at 223. 
 24. Id. 
 25. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 20, at § 487. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. The rules of fault apportionment can be contrasted with causal apportionment, 
which is applicable when multiple parties cause a divisible harm. Therefore, if there is an 
evidentiary basis for causal apportionment, different rules may be applied by the court. 
 28. Cary, supra note 17, at 278. 
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the plaintiff’s recovery should be reduced.29 Traditionally, contributory 
negligence was treated as an all-or-nothing defense, meaning a plaintiff 
could not recover from the defendant if the plaintiff was responsible for any 
degree of the harm.30 This rule often led to particularly harsh results, 
especially when the injured plaintiff’s own negligence was relatively 
insignificant compared to the defendant’s negligent behavior.31 
Nevertheless, those courts that were early adopters of contributory 
negligence as a defense adhered to the belief that liability for a single, 
indivisible injury must fall on one party or the other.32 
Today, however, almost every jurisdiction has adopted a more 
modern approach for apportioning damages between the plaintiff and 
defendant, based on their proportionate shares of fault: comparative 
negligence.33 This doctrine was introduced as a response to the traditional 
contributory negligence rule,34 as courts began to shift the focus in 
negligence suits toward compensating the injured plaintiff in the most just 
way possible.35 Georgia led this slow movement by enacting a comparative 
negligence statute in 1855, and by 1931, Mississippi and Wisconsin had 
followed suit. Between 1969 and 1973, at least 20 more states had adopted 
a form of comparative negligence by statute or judicial decision.36 
Although administrative simplification arguments favor the 
contributory negligence rule, the argument for comparative negligence was 
ultimately deemed to be stronger, as 46 states now recognize some form of 
comparative fault.37 Unlike contributory negligence, comparative fault is 
                                                
 29. Id. at 279. 
 30. COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE, supra note 1, § 1:1. 
 31. Cary, supra note 17, at 280. 
 32. Id. (citing Heil v. Glanding, 42 Pa. 493, 499 (1862)) (“The reason why, in cases of 
mutual concurring negligence, neither party can maintain an action against the other, is . . . 
that the law cannot measure how much the damage suffered is attributable to the plaintiff’s 
own fault.”). 
 33. See generally COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE, supra note 1, § 2:4–2:6. The term 
comparative fault typically encompasses both the concept of comparative negligence and 
comparative fault, which are often used interchangeably. Brian P. Dunigan & Jerry 
J. Phillips, Comparative Fault in Tennessee: Where Are We Going, and Why Are We in this 
Handbasket?, 67 TENN. L. REV. 765, n.6 (2000). Both terms describe methods of allocating 
damages based on each party’s fault for the injury; however, comparative negligence 
specifically refers to the measure of the plaintiff’s negligence used for the purpose of 
reducing the plaintiff’s recovery from the defendant, while comparative fault specifically 
refers to the determination of how to apportion damages among multiple defendants 
according to the percentage of fault attributed to each. Id. 
 34. COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE, supra note 1, § 1:1. 
 35. Cary, supra note 17, at 281. 
 36. EPSTEIN, supra note 14, at 211. 
 37. Id. Alabama, Maryland, North Carolina, Virginia, and the District of Columbia 
still recognize the traditional contributory negligence rule. Contributory 
Negligence/Comparative Fault Laws in All 50 States, MATTHIESEN, WICKERT & LEHRER, 
S.C. 1–2 (Dec. 15, 2015), https://www.mwl-law.com/wp-
content/uploads/2013/03/contributory-negligence-comparative-fault-laws-in-all-50-
states.pdf [perma.cc/F52M-ZKPL].  
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based on the rationale that each party should bear the financial 
responsibility for their own failure to exercise ordinary care under the 
circumstances.38 It also rests on the assumption that the old “all-or-nothing” 
rule is unjust because it requires a negligent plaintiff to bear the full burden 
of loss, even if the defendant’s conduct was far more blameworthy.39 In 
contrast, the comparative fault rule gives neither the negligent plaintiff nor 
the lucky defendant a free pass for failing to exercise due care.40 
As the doctrine of comparative fault developed, two distinct 
approaches to allocating liability emerged: pure comparative fault and 
modified comparative fault.41 In a jurisdiction following pure comparative 
fault, which is the simplest form of comparative fault, damages are reduced 
strictly in proportion to the plaintiff’s own responsibility for his or her own 
injury.42 Thus, the jury determines the percentage of fault for both the 
plaintiff and the defendant, and the plaintiff’s recovery is reduced in 
proportion to the plaintiff’s own fault.43 This is true regardless of the 
plaintiff’s degree of fault.44 A plaintiff who is primarily at fault may still 
recover from a defendant who was less at fault.45 Twelve states follow this 
system.46 
In order to avoid situations in which a severely negligent plaintiff 
would be permitted to recover against a slightly negligent defendant, most 
states have adopted a modified comparative fault approach.47 Under a 
modified approach, damages are similarly reduced in proportion to the 
plaintiff’s own percentage of fault, but recovery is not permitted if the 
plaintiff’s negligence exceeds a certain percentage.48 Therefore, the plaintiff 
is required to prove that his degree of fault is below the fixed threshold 
before he can recover.49 In 11 states, the jury must determine the plaintiff 
                                                
 38. Jay M. Allen, Damage Apportionment In Accounting Malpractice Actions: The 
Role Of Comparative Fault, 1990 BYU L. REV. 949, 971 (1990). 
 39. EPSTEIN, supra note 14, at 211. 
 40. Id. 
 41. See generally David C. Sobelsohn, “Pure” vs. “Modified” Comparative Fault: 
Notes on the Debate, 34 EMORY L.J. 65 (1985). 
 42. Cary, supra note 17, at 282. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. See id. 
 46. Contributory Negligence, supra note 37, at 2–3 (Alaska, Arizona, California, 
Florida, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, New Mexico, New York, Rhode Island, 
and Washington). 
 47. Cary, supra note 17, at 282. Courts have given other reasons for adopting modified 
comparative fault. For example, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia noted that 
the pure comparative negligence rule makes potential plaintiffs out of all parties whose fault 
contributed to an accident and that the rule favors the party who incurred the most damages, 
even if that party is apportioned a greater percentage of fault. Bradley v. Appalachian Power 
Co., 256 S.E.2d 879, 887 (W. Va. 1979). 
 48. Contributory Negligence, supra note 37, at 3. 
 49. Id. In addition, South Dakota recognizes a form of modified comparative fault in 
which the fault of the plaintiff and defendant is only compared if the plaintiff’s negligence is 
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was less than 50% at fault before recovery is permitted.50 In 22 states, the 
bar is set at 51%, so the plaintiff cannot recover if he is apportioned 51% or 
more of the fault.51 In all 33 states following the modified contributory fault 
rule, if the plaintiff’s percentage of fault falls below the relevant 
percentage, he is not barred from recovering.52 Therefore, this modified rule 
can be seen as a compromise between traditional contributory negligence 
and pure comparative fault, in that it only imposes a complete bar to 
recovery if the plaintiff is equally or more at fault than the defendant.53 The 
goal of compensating the plaintiff is balanced with the competing goal of 
deterring negligence on the part of the plaintiff.54 
Most lawmakers and scholars agree that comparative fault has 
positively changed tort law and recognize that comparative fault alleviates 
the harsh results of the traditional contributory negligence rule.55 It should 
also be noted that courts and legislatures did not only consider fairness to 
plaintiffs when moving toward a system of comparative fault, but also 
fairness to defendants or any other wrongdoers. The specific reasons for the 
shift vary considerably from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but the underlying 
philosophy is this: “each wrongdoer should pay for his or her own fault, no 
more and no less.”56 
2. Joint and Several Liability 
With the widespread acceptance of comparative fault principles 
came challenges to the common law doctrine of joint and several liability.57 
Joint and several liability comes into play when multiple defendants are 
                                                                                                             
“slight” and the defendant’s is “gross.” Id. at 6. If the factfinder determines that the 
plaintiff’s negligence is more that “slight,” the plaintiff is barred from recovery. Id. 
 50. Id. at 3 (Arkansas, Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Maine, Nebraska, North 
Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, and West Virginia). 
 51. Id. at 4 (Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Massachusetts, 
Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma, 
Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Vermont, Wisconsin, and Wyoming). 
 52. Id. at 3. 
 53. Cary, supra note 17, at 282. 
 54. Id. 
 55. COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE, supra note 1, § 1:2. 
 56. Id. For example, in moving to a modified comparative fault system, the Supreme 
Court of Tennessee stated:  
Our adoption of comparative fault is due largely to considerations of 
fairness: the contributory negligence doctrine unjustly allowed the entire 
loss to be borne by a negligent plaintiff, notwithstanding that the plaintiff’s 
fault was minor in comparison to defendant’s . . . Further, because a 
particular defendant will henceforth be liable only for the percentage of a 
plaintiff’s damages occasioned by that defendant’s negligence, situations 
where a defendant has paid more than his “share” of a judgment will no 
longer arise.  
McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52, 58 (Tenn. 1992). 
 57. EPSTEIN, supra note 14, at 223. 
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responsible for a single, indivisible harm to a plaintiff, and the loss must be 
apportioned between them.58 Traditionally the legal response to joint 
tortfeasors was to hold each responsible for the entire indivisible harm.59 
Under this system of joint and several liability, a plaintiff may recover all of 
the damages for an injury from any individual defendant who is partially at 
fault, and the joint tortfeasors can typically be sued together or separately.60 
Therefore the risk of insolvency of one or more defendants and the burden 
of identifying additional tortfeasors is placed on the defendants, rather than 
on the plaintiff.61 This traditional rule of joint and several liability, often 
called pure joint and several liability, is still followed in eight 
jurisdictions.62 
However, since the advent of comparative fault and the move away 
from the all-or-nothing rule of contributory negligence, the pure system of 
joint and several liability has also been modified or thrown out altogether in 
the majority of jurisdictions, giving way to several liability.63 Several 
liability describes a system of apportionment wherein each defendant is 
liable to the plaintiff only for the share of damages attributable to that 
defendant’s negligence, placing the burden of identifying additional 
tortfeasors and the risk of insolvency on the plaintiff.64 This is known as 
pure several liability, and is the practice in 14 states.65 Rather than fully 
shift that burden to the plaintiff, 28 states have adopted a modified version 
of the traditional joint and several liability rule.66 These jurisdictions that 
recognize a modified rule typically only allow a defendant whose fault is 
above a certain threshold to be responsible for the entire loss.67 
States that follow the modern trend of moving away from joint and 
several liability rely on the principle that it is possible and desirable to 
apportion loss among multiple parties and propose that the principles of 
comparative fault used to allocate fault between a plaintiff and defendant 
can also work for allocating fault between two or more defendants.68 By 
                                                
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Joint and Several Liability and Contribution Laws in All 50 States, MATTHIESEN, 
WICKERT & LEHRER, S.C. 2 (Jan. 26, 2016), https://www.mwl-law.com/wp-
content/uploads/2013/03/contribution-actions-in-all-50-states.pdf [perma.cc/CKG7-E7RJ]. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. (Alabama, Delaware, Maryland, Massachusetts, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, 
Rhode Island, and Virginia). 
 63. EPSTEIN, supra note 14, at 225. 
 64. Joint and Several, supra note 60, at 2. 
 65. Id. (Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, 
Kentucky, Michigan, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, and Wyoming). 
 66. Id. (California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, 
Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New 
Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, 
South Dakota, Texas, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin). 
 67. Id. 
 68. EPSTEIN, supra note 14, at 225. 
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infusing the justification for comparative fault into the context of a suit 
against multiple defendants, these jurisdictions recognize that each party, 
including all plaintiffs and defendants, should only be held responsible for 
the consequences of his or her own actions.69 
3. Contribution 
Recognition of comparative fault principles also led to 
dissatisfaction with the traditional common law rule of disallowing 
contribution.70 Contribution is a claim brought by one joint tortfeasor 
against another to recover all or part of the damages the first owes to an 
injured plaintiff.71 The rule denying contribution among tortfeasors 
originally flowed from the idea that the law will not lend its hand in aid of a 
wrongdoer, so one defendant that had partially or fully compensated a 
plaintiff was not permitted to use the courts to obtain contribution from 
another defendant.72 Therefore, at common law, a defendant could not only 
potentially be held responsible for the full amount of damages under the 
doctrine of joint and several liability, but could also be precluded from 
filing a separate action to recover from a joint tortfeasor.73 
Although the common law no-contribution rule was widely 
accepted and applied for many years, it was also criticized, especially in 
light of the growing acceptance of comparative fault principles in the late 
1960s and early 1970s.74 A rule that allowed a plaintiff to attach full 
liability to a defendant with deep pockets even if his percentage of fault for 
the harm was minimal eventually became too difficult to justify.75 Today 
most states have created, either by statute or judicial decision, a right to 
bring a contribution suit when two or more tortfeasors are jointly or 
severally liable for the same injury.76 The right exists when a tortfeasor has 
paid in excess of his pro rata share of the common liability.77 The tortfeasor 
has the option to claim contribution in the original lawsuit by filing a cross-
claim against a co-defendant or impleading a new party.78 There is also the 
option of seeking contribution in a separate lawsuit.79 
                                                
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 231. 
 71. Id. at 230. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 231. 
 75. Id. 
 76. UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT, 12 U.L.A. 7 (1982). 
However, the rule of no-contribution remains unchanged for intentional tortfeasors. EPSTEIN, 
supra note 14, at 231. 
 77. UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION, supra note 76. 
 78. Joint and Several, supra note 60, at 2. 
 79. Id. 
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4. Immunities 
Yet another area of tort liability in which comparative fault 
principles created complications is that of immunity. In raising an immunity 
defense, a defendant asserts that he should escape liability for his conduct 
because of his status or relationship to the plaintiff.80 Exemption from tort 
liability must be justified by compelling policy aims, and each established 
immunity is justified for different reasons.81 As discussed in the following 
section, the issue of immunity arises most frequently when employers 
provide employees benefits through workers’ compensation and, thus, are 
generally immune to tort liability.82 Because the practical result of granting 
immunities is that the plaintiff is not compensated for harm suffered, the 
law generally favors limiting the availability of immunities.83 
When more than one individual causes a plaintiff’s harm, but one 
of those individuals is immune from liability, the jury is required to 
compare the entire fault that is the cause of the harm, including the fault of 
the immune individual.84 So not only must courts decide whether juries 
should apportion fault to tortfeasors not joined as parties because they 
cannot be located or are insolvent, but courts must also determine whether 
fault should be apportioned to those who have established their immunity.85 
Many courts have held that the negligence of immune parties must be 
considered in determining the fault percentages of other tortfeasors, but 
statutes in several states provide that the negligence of non-parties is not to 
be compared.86 In jurisdictions recognizing principles of comparative fault, 
if the fault of an immune party is considered, it will reduce the amount of 
fault that can be assigned to the defendant and the plaintiff’s recovery.87 
B. The Workers’ Compensation “Bargain” 
All states have some sort of workers’ compensation statute, which 
is meant to wholly substitute the tort system whenever an employee is 
injured in the course of employment.88 States began to pass workers’ 
compensation laws in the early part of the 20th century in response to the 
great difficulty employees faced in recovering tort damages for workplace 
injuries among other things.89 Before workers’ compensation laws 
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intervened, employees would file suit only to be met with various defenses 
that they were unlikely to overcome, such as the fellow servant rule, 
voluntary assumption of the risk, and contributory negligence.90 Most were 
not even able to secure representation.91 The early founders of workers’ 
compensation law stressed the importance of avoiding the uncertainties and 
complications of litigation and substituting simple remedies.92 
Under modern state workers’ compensation statutes, employees are 
able to recover even when a tort suit likely would fail because an 
employee’s right to compensation depends solely on whether or not the 
employee suffered a work-related injury, so negligence and fault are 
essentially immaterial.93 Thus, even if the employer was not remotely at 
fault, liability is not extinguished, and even if the injured employee is 
partially to blame for his own injury, his right to contribution is not 
affected.94 
But, of course, in exchange for this benefit there is a tradeoff. All 
states have exclusive remedy provisions, which serve as part of the quid pro 
quo by making workers’ compensation the exclusive remedy for the 
employee’s injury once the act becomes applicable.95 Whether the act 
becomes applicable through compulsion or, in some states, by election, an 
injured employee no longer has the right to sue the employer in tort or 
otherwise recover compensation.96 In addition, a majority of states also bar 
an injured employee from bringing a negligence action against a coworker 
for injuries caused during the course of employment.97 The interests of 
employees and employers are supposedly put in balance by relieving the 
possibility of a large damage verdict against the employer.98 However, 
critics argue that the limited benefits available to employees are insufficient 
to make the tradeoff a fair one.99 
While exclusive remedy provisions may bar an injured employee 
from suing an employer (and generally coworkers) in tort, these provisions 
do not prevent an employee from suing others for work accidents, so the 
employee retains the right to file a tort action against a third-party 
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defendant.100 However, under the typical workers’ compensation statute, the 
employer (or the employer’s insurance carrier) is then permitted to seek 
subrogation against the award to recover the compensation paid to the 
employee. The proceeds from the tort suit are used to reimburse the 
employer and any balance goes to the employee.101 Additionally, a majority 
of jurisdictions ban contribution by a third-party defendant against an 
employer, which means third-party defendants are not allowed to sue or 
join a concurrently negligent employer as a joint tortfeasor when the 
employer’s negligence was also to blame for the injury.102 The theory 
behind this rule is that the employer is not jointly liable to the employee in 
tort because of the exclusive remedy provision and therefore is not jointly 
liable.103 
II. EXISTING APPROACHES 
When an injured employee receives workers’ compensation 
benefits and decides to sue a third party who also contributed to the 
employee’s injury, litigation often ends with a troublesome result: the 
blameworthy employer is able to profit by reimbursement of its 
compensation expenditures. Although there is general agreement among 
scholars that the adoption of comparative fault principles has been a 
positive development, states have struggled with determining how those 
principles should affect other areas of the law, such as here. Though there is 
a clear majority view regarding how to treat such situations, a number of 
alternative approaches have immerged, including the “California–North 
Carolina approach,” the “New York approach,” and the “Minnesota 
approach.” 
A. The Majority Approach: No Fault Allocation and No Contribution 
In most jurisdictions, a third-party defendant cannot raise a defense 
that the employer’s negligence contributed to an employee’s injury, and the 
employer may not be assigned a percentage of comparative 
responsibility.104 The rationale behind this majority approach is that fault 
may be attributed only to those persons against whom the plaintiff has a 
cause of action in tort, and the plaintiff does not have a cause of action 
against an immune employer or co-employee.105 Rejecting an argument that 
fault should be assigned to an immune employer, one court noted:  
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[P]laintiffs would be subject to a double reduction of their 
recovery against third parties who contributed to their on-
the-job injuries. The first reduction would occur when the 
jury apportioned fault to the employer. The second would 
occur when the workers’ compensation insurance carrier 
exercised its right to subrogation against the plaintiff’s 
recovery from the third party.106  
The majority rule is also justified by the theory that the cause of action is 
the employee’s, and therefore his full recovery should not be affected by his 
employer’s negligence.107 
Additionally, any recovery-over by the third-party defendant 
against the employer by either contribution or implied indemnity is barred, 
and the employer retains its subrogation lien for the full amount it has paid 
to the employee against any award or settlement the employee obtains 
against the third-party defendant, without regard to the employer’s fault.108 
In these jurisdictions, the continued right of subrogation even when the 
employer is partially at fault for the plaintiff’s injuries is justified by the 
generally accepted rule that the plaintiff should not be permitted double 
recovery.109 In these states the injured employee comes out “fully 
compensated,” in that the employee ends up with roughly the full amount of 
damages received from the third-party defendant and no more.110 Another 
justification is that because the employer is not a “tortfeasor,” there is no 
common liability with the third-party defendant to allow for a claim for 
contribution.111 For these reasons, commentators have deemed the majority 
approach a “pro-employer approach” and an “all-or-nothing rule.”112 
Returning to the Eddy Employee example above, under the 
majority approach, if at trial the jury finds Driver to be at fault for Eddy 
Employee’s injuries, no matter what the percentage, then Driver will have 
to bear the liability both for his own fault and that of Carl Coworker. 
Assuming Eddy prevails at establishing some fault and recovers $200,000, 
Employer Co. will be permitted to recover the $20,000 that it paid 
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previously in workers’ compensation benefits even though its negligent 
employee Carl was more at fault than Driver. 
B. The California–North Carolina Approach: Reduction of Tort 
Recovery 
In response to the result of the majority approach, several 
jurisdictions have adopted a different approach, either by judicial decision 
or by statutory reform, based primarily on the general idea that no one 
should profit from his own wrong.113 These jurisdictions allow a third-party 
defendant to offer evidence of the concurrent negligence of an employer (or 
coworker) as a pro tanto defense, resulting in a direct reduction of the 
injured employee’s damage award if the defendant is successful.114 This 
general approach varies slightly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.115 In North 
Carolina, California, Idaho, and Nevada, for example, when the defendant 
proves that the employer’s negligence was a contributing factor, the 
damage award is reduced by the amount of workers’ compensation benefits 
paid to the employee.116 Conversely, in Arizona, Utah, Kansas, and 
Louisiana, the recovery is reduced to the extent of the employer’s 
proportional fault.117 In most of these jurisdictions, the concurrently 
negligent employer can still bring a subrogation claim for the amount by 
which the compensation paid exceeded the employer’s proportional share 
of fault for the injury.118 However, it appears that at least one jurisdiction 
eliminates the employers subrogation entirely if the employer is found to be 
concurrently negligent.119 
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Using the Eddy Employee example, if the accident occurred in 
North Carolina, California, Idaho, or Nevada, Eddy’s $200,000 verdict 
would be reduced by the $20,000 that Employer Co. paid him in workers’ 
compensation benefits.120 The jury would be permitted to allocate fault to 
Driver and to Carl; however, Driver would be responsible for the remaining 
$180,000 regardless of the result. The percentages determined by the jury 
would only be used to calculate the amount for which Employer Co. is 
entitled to reimbursement. Assuming that Carl was more at fault than 
Driver, Employer Co. would not be able to receive reimbursement because 
the compensation paid would not exceed Carl’s proportional share of fault. 
Under the modified version of the approach followed in Arizona, 
Utah, Kansas, and Louisiana, the jury would be permitted to allocate fault 
to Driver and to Carl. Suppose the jury determined that Driver was 25% at 
fault, while Carl was determined to be 75% at fault. In Eddy’s suit against 
Driver, Driver would be responsible for $50,000 of the total damage award 
of $200,000. Employer Co. or its insurance carrier would not be permitted 
to recover in subrogation because the amount of workers’ compensation 
benefits paid, $20,000, did not exceed Carl’s proportional share of fault. 
However, to change the facts, suppose the jury first determined that Eddy 
had suffered $100,000 in damages, and Employer Co. had already paid 
Eddy $20,000 in workers’ compensation benefits. Also assume the jury 
determined that Carl was only 10% at fault, while Driver was 90% at fault. 
In this situation, Driver would be responsible for $90,000 of the damage 
award, and Employer Co. would be able to seek reimbursement for 
$10,000, the amount that exceeded Carl’s proportional share of fault. 
C. The New York Approach: Contribution Proportionate to Fault 
New York has addressed the dilemma by allowing third-party 
defendants to seek contribution from negligent employers based on the 
employer’s proportion of fault, while retaining the employer’s right of 
subrogation.121 The New York courts fashioned a rule that goes the furthest 
in protecting the interests of third-party defendants, providing unlimited 
recovery-over.122 In New York, the employee recovers workers’ 
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compensation benefits from the employer, full tort damages from the third-
party defendant, and reimburses the employer for compensation benefits 
received out of the damages award.123 The defendant then receives 
contribution from the employer proportionate to the employer’s fault.124 
Therefore, the liability of the employer and the third-party 
defendant is ultimately proportioned to their relative fault, and the 
employee is left fully compensated.125 Generally this approach led to 
employers paying only slightly more to an injured employee than it would 
have under the typical workers’ compensation award,126 but one can 
imagine circumstances under which the employer would pay substantially 
more than its typical limited liability, particularly when the damages 
awarded are high and the employer is allocated a large percentage of fault. 
This led the New York legislature to limit the rule’s application to allow 
employer liability for contribution or indemnity only when the employee 
has suffered a “grave injury.”127 
Changing the facts in the Eddy Employee example illustrates the 
typical outcome under the New York approach. Suppose that Eddy suffered 
a “grave injury,” such as the loss of a limb,128 that the total damage award 
was $20,000, and that Eddy received $9,000 in benefits from Employer Co. 
If the jury assigns 60% of the fault to Carl Coworker and 40% of the fault 
to Driver, Eddy would recover the full $20,000 award from Driver, but 
Driver is entitled to seek contribution from Employer Co. for $12,000, 
which reflects the percentage of Carl’s fault. Additionally, Employer Co. 
retains its subrogation right, and is entitled to $9,000 of Eddy’s tort award, 
preventing Eddy’s double recovery. Therefore, Eddy is left fully 
compensated, receiving the full tort award of $20,000. Driver eventually 
pays only $8,000, calculated in relation to his fault, and Employer Co. 
eventually pays $12,000, in relation to its fault (via Carl Coworker). 
Although Employer Co. is saddled with a payment higher than it would 
have typically been responsible for under the exclusive remedy rule, the 
difference between $9,000 and $12,000 is not extreme. 
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Yet, consider how the example case would play out under the 
original facts. Eddy suffered a “grave injury,” and he received a $200,000 
verdict and $20,000 in benefits. The jury determined that Driver was 25% 
at fault and Carl was 75% at fault. Again, Eddy is left fully compensated, 
receiving the full $200,000 tort award. However, after contribution and 
subrogation rights are exercised, Driver will have paid $50,000, and 
Employer Co. will have paid $150,000. Consequently, the portion of the 
total $200,000 award paid by Employer Co. greatly exceeds the limited 
benefits that it would ordinarily expect to pay to an injured employee. 
D. The Minnesota Approach: Limited Contribution 
Minnesota’s Supreme Court, recognizing the problems with New 
York’s approach, sought to balance the policies in favor of comparative 
fault and those in favor of workers’ compensation exclusive remedy 
provisions.129 The Minnesota approach, like the New York rule, allows the 
injured employee to receive his full tort award from the third-party 
defendant but also allows contribution by the employer in proportion to its 
fault.130 But Minnesota places a ceiling on the employer’s liability in the 
amount of its workers’ compensation obligation.131 The employer also 
retains its subrogation right.132 In adopting this approach, the Supreme 
Court of Minnesota relied on the concept that contribution is an equitable 
doctrine.133 It conceded the lack of common liability, which is ordinarily 
required to support contribution, between a third-party defendant and 
employer, but the court concluded that the concept should not prevent an 
equitable result.134 The approach is also consistant with the workers’ 
compensation policy of limited liability for employers, in that the employer 
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pays out no more than it expected to under the compensation act.135 For 
these reasons, this approach is often considered a compromise between the 
policies underlying the workers’ compensation and tort systems.136 
Using the Minnesota rule, the litigation would play out much as it 
would under the New York approach. Eddy will be able to recover the full 
$200,000 from Driver, and Driver is permitted to seek contribution from 
Employer Co. But because Employer Co. cannot be forced to contribute 
beyond its workers’ compensation liability, Driver will only be able to 
recover $20,000 from Employer Co. Employer Co. will then exercise its 
subrogation right against Eddy’s tort award. Therefore, Driver, who was 
25% at fault, eventually pays $180,000 and Employer Co., responsible for 
Carl’s 75% of fault, pays $20,000, amounts that are undoubtedly not in 
proportion to their relative fault. 
Nevertheless, under a different set of facts, the result under the 
Minnesota approach might not seem as severe. Assuming Eddy received a 
$20,000 verdict and $9,000 in benefits and that Carl and Driver were each 
50% at fault, Driver would be permitted to recover $9,000 from Employer 
Co. Although Driver would be left paying $11,000, which is still in excess 
of his proportion of fault, the result is much closer to being proportionate 
under these facts. 
III. VARIOUS SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS TO THE DELIMMA 
In addition to legislatures and courts, commentators and scholars 
have weighed in on the discussion to propose solutions to the problem of 
meshing workers’ compensation and tort law. Although none of these 
approaches have been adopted in any jurisdiction, these proposals have 
gained differing levels of support in the legal field. The most prevalent of 
these approaches include (1) abolishment of suits against third parties, (2) a 
separation of workers’ compensation and tort systems, (3) the “Murray 
Credit” rule, (4) a proposal by Professor Clifford Davis, (5) a proposal by 
Professor Arthur Larson, and (6) a proposal by Professor Andrew R. Klein. 
A. Abolish Third Party Suits 
Often considered the most extreme approach, some have advocated 
for the complete elimination of third-party lawsuits.137 Such scholars have 
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argued, in various forms, that a system for improving compensation 
benefits received by the employee in the event of a workplace injury should 
be put in place, eliminating the need for third-party suits.138 Some 
proponents support the idea of complete abolition of such suits, but under 
one theory, the employer, not the employee, would be given the chance to 
negotiate or litigate for reimbursement from third parties who might 
otherwise be liable in tort.139 
Considering the Eddy Employee example, the obvious result if 
third-party suits were abolished would be that Eddy’s only recovery would 
come from workers’ compensation benefits. Although the difference might 
be less pronounced under a different set of facts, the difference in Eddy’s 
case, a $200,000 tort award versus $20,000 in benefits, would be 
particularly drastic. This is the result assuming that the workers’ 
compensation system is not improved. 
B. Completely Separate Workers’ Compensation and Tort Systems 
Some academics have supported the idea of a complete separation 
of workers’ compensation and tort systems.140 Such an approach would 
limit the third-party defendant’s liability to his proportional share of fault 
and eliminate the employer’s right of subrogation.141 This proposal would 
serve the defendant’s interest in proportional liability and the employer’s 
interest in limited liability, but, in contrast to all of the existing approaches 
to the dilemma, it is likely that the injured employee would not be fully 
compensated.142 
Under this complete separation approach, Eddy Employee would 
not receive full compensation. Assume Eddy received a $200,000 verdict 
and $20,000 in benefits and that the jury found Driver to be 25% at fault 
and Carl to be 75% at fault. Driver’s damages would be reduced to $50,000 
in proportion to his relative fault. Therefore, taking into account the 
workers’ compensation benefits paid by Employer Co., Eddy would receive 
$70,000 of the $200,000 that it would take to place him back in his rightful 
position according to the jury. 
Nevertheless, Eddy could be fully compensated under this approach 
if a different set of facts is considered. Assume that Eddy received a 
$20,000 verdict and $9,000 in benefits, but this time, Carl was 40% at fault 
and Driver was 60% at fault. Driver’s damages would then be reduced to 
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$12,000, proportionate to his fault. Consequently, Eddy would actually be 
over-compensated, receiving $21,000 from the combination of the tort 
award and the workers’ compensation benefits. 
C. The “Murray Credit” Rule 
Some commentators have recognized a potential solution to the 
problem using the holding of the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia in the case of Murray v. United States,143 which involved a 
government employee who was injured on the job.144 In the employee’s suit 
against a concurrently negligent third-party defendant, the court 
acknowledged that because the government was the employer, it had 
immunity; however, rather than placing full responsibility for the tort 
damages on the defendant, the court viewed the government as a party that 
had settled its dispute with the injured employee.145 In doing such, it 
triggered the rule that 
 “where one joint tortfeasor causing injury compromises 
the claim, the other tortfeasor, though unable to obtain 
contribution because the settling tortfeasor had ‘bought his 
peace,’ is nonetheless protected by having his tort 
judgment reduced by one-half, on the theory that one-half 
of the claim was sold by the victim when he executed the 
settlement . . . . The Murray rule, therefore, allows the 
third-party a per capita credit based on the employer’s 
contribution to the injury.”146  
Thus, if this rule was implemented, third-party recovery would 
simply be reduced by half if the employer was found to be negligent, and 
the employer would still retain its subrogation right.147 
Returning to the example case, under the “Murray Credit” rule, 
allocation of fault is not necessary. If Carl Coworker is found to be partially 
to blame, the damage award would be cut in half, and Driver would be 
responsible for $100,000 of the $200,000 in damages. Moreover, Employer 
Co. is entitled to exercise its subrogation right and recover the $20,000 paid 
in benefits. This leaves Eddy with a total recovery of compensation plus 
damages of only $80,000, even though at trial Eddy presumably established 
actual damages of $200,000. 
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D. Professor Clifford Davis’s Proposal 
Professor Clifford Davis proposed a unique solution to the dilemma 
as early as 1976.148 He asserted that in a suit between an employee and a 
third-party defendant, the percentage of fault of the employer and defendant 
should first be calculated.149 This percentage would then be applied to the 
damage award, so the third-party defendant would be liable for the damage 
verdict multiplied by the defendant’s percentage of fault.150 When the 
employer exercises its subrogation right, the employer’s recovery from the 
plaintiff would be reduced according to its percentage of fault.151 An 
employer found to be 10% at fault for an employee’s injury, therefore, 
would have its subrogation recovery reduced by 10%.152 This approach 
increases the use of comparative fault principles in assessing employer 
liability.153 
Recall that in the Eddy Employee example the jury found Driver to 
be 25% at fault and Carl Coworker to be 75% at fault. Under Professor 
Davis’s approach, Eddy would receive $50,000, or 25% of the $200,000 
verdict, from Driver. Employer Co. would retain its subrogation right, but 
the $20,000 it paid in workers’ compensation benefits would be reduced by 
75%, Carl’s percentage of fault, to $5,000. Thus, Employer Co. would 
recover $5,000 from Eddy, and Eddy would be left with $45,000 of the 
$200,000 verdict. 
E. Professor Arthur Larson’s Proposal 
In 1982, Professor Arthur Larson first suggested an approach that 
he described as an adaptation of the North Carolina-California approach, 
which he considered to be too complex.154 He sought to create an approach 
that would “achieve maximum simplicity without, perhaps, too shocking a 
departure from equity.”155 Under Professor Larson’s approach, the 
employee’s recovery from the third-party defendant would be reduced by 
the amount of workers’ compensation benefits received.156 This reduction 
would occur in all cases, not just in those involving employer negligence.157 
Next, subrogation by the employer would be abolished in all cases because 
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the employee would not be fully compensated by the third-party 
defendant.158 All recovery-over by the third-party defendant would also be 
abolished.159 Thus, under this approach, the employee comes out with full 
damages, and the defendant’s liability is reduced, though not in proportion 
to fault.160 The employer is left without opportunity for reimbursement 
through subrogation but is protected from contribution claims by the third-
party defendant.161 
This proposed solution achieves Professor Larson’s goal of 
simplicity, but opinions on the fairness of the result might depend on the 
particular facts of the case. Consider the Eddy Employee example with the 
original facts. Driver’s liability would be decreased by $20,000, the amount 
of workers’ compensation benefits paid, from $200,000 to $180,000. This 
result seems unjust from Driver’s perspective, given that Carl Coworker 
was 75% at fault. 
However, suppose Eddy received $20,000 in benefits but only a 
$50,000 verdict. Also assume that Driver was 80% at fault and Carl was 
only 20% at fault. Under these facts, Driver’s liability would be reduced to 
$30,000, which is less than his percentage of fault. Here, the result, while 
obviously more appealing to Driver, is that Employer Co. would pay 
greater than its percentage of fault through workers’ compensation benefits 
and would be left without a subrogation right. 
F. Professor Andrew R. Klein’s Proposal 
More recently, Professor Andrew R. Klein made a proposal, which 
would treat the payment of workers’ compensation benefits as a settlement 
and limit the third-party defendant’s tort liability according to comparative 
fault principles.162 Treating a workers’ compensation payment as a 
settlement between the injured employee and the employer would eliminate 
the employer’s subrogation rights.163 According to Professor Klein, there is 
no reason to alter this “settlement” by giving the employer a right to 
subrogation or by ignoring the limited liability rule and giving the plaintiff 
additional payment.164 He expressed great concern with importing 
comparative fault principles into the workers’ compensation system 
because doing so would violate the core workers’ compensation principle of 
limited liability.165 
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Applying Professor Klein’s approach, Eddy Employee might come 
out over-compensated or under-compensated, depending on the particular 
facts. Under the original facts, Eddy would receive $50,000, or 25% of the 
$200,000 verdict, in damages from Driver. The $20,000 that Eddy received 
in benefits from Employer Co. would be treated as a settlement. Therefore, 
Eddy would retain $70,000 from the combined tort award and workers’ 
compensation benefits, leaving him significantly undercompensated. 
Yet, consider a situation in which Eddy suffered $50,000 in 
damages and received $10,000 in workers’ compensation benefits. Suppose 
Driver was 90% at fault and Carl was only 10% at fault. Eddy would 
recover $45,000 from driver and retain the $10,000 in benefits, leaving 
Eddy over-compensated by $5,000. He would retain $55,000 total, when he 
only suffered $50,000 in damages. 
IV. AUTHOR’S PROPOSED SOLUTION 
As stated by Professor Klein, “Ideally, a scholarly proposal should 
mesh tort law and workers’ compensation while respecting the essential 
components of both systems.”166 The problem is that these two systems of 
law cannot be meshed perfectly. The tort concepts of ensuring that each 
party is not taxed with any liability for an injury beyond the extent of his 
actual fault and an injured party’s right to compensation are simply 
inconsistent with the no-fault system created by the employee–employer 
bargain in workers’ compensation law.167 Professor Larson has long 
described the problem as the “most evenly balanced controversy” for which 
one of the three parties’ interests will always be favored over the others.168 
A. The New Approach 
While agreeing that a solution is in order, this note favors a slightly 
different, and perhaps unconventional, solution to the dilemma. This new 
approach seeks to account, in part, for the interests of all three parties, while 
still recognizing principles of comparative fault and respecting the 
employee–employer workers’ compensation bargain. Under this approach, 
the damage verdict would initially be reduced by the amount of workers’ 
compensation benefits received by the injured employee. The jury would be 
permitted to allocate fault between the third-party defendant and the 
employer, and rather than permitting contribution, the defendant’s liability 
would be reduced in proportion to his percentage of fault. Any portion of 
the total damage verdict that remained unaccounted for would then be 
divided equally between the plaintiff and the third-party defendant. 
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Additionally, the employer’s subrogation right would be eliminated upon a 
finding that the employer (or a coworker) was partially at fault. 
Depending on the particular facts of the case, the burden of inequity 
would fall on a different party. Returning to the Eddy Employee example, 
under this new approach, the $200,000 damage verdict would be reduced 
by the $20,000 in workers’ compensation benefits paid by Employer Co., 
leaving it at $180,000. Driver’s liability would initially be reduced to 
$50,000 because Driver was found to be 25% at fault. To make Eddy 
whole, the $130,000 difference between Driver’s liability and workers’ 
compensation benefits would then be split between Driver and Eddy. In 
effect, this would increase Driver’s liability to $115,000 ($50,000 plus half 
of the $130,000 difference). In this scenario, Eddy does not come out fully 
compensated and Driver pays in excess of his relative percentage of fault. 
Consider, however, a different set of facts. Suppose the total 
damage award was $20,000, and Eddy received $9,000 in benefits from 
Employer Co. Assume the jury determines that Carl Coworker was 40% at 
fault and Driver was 60% at fault. After the damage verdict is reduced by 
the compensation benefits, it is left at $11,000. Ordinarily, Driver’s liability 
would be reduced to $12,000 in proportion to his fault; however, Driver 
would only be liable for $11,000 under these facts, the portion of the 
verdict remaining. Although Employer Co. paid $9,000 in benefits, which is 
greater that its relative percentage of fault, it is left without a right to 
recover the amount it paid in excess through subrogation. Therefore, under 
this scenario, Employer Co. bears the burden of inequity. 
B. Comparison to Existing Approaches and Other Suggested Solutions 
The new approach seeks to improve upon the various issues created 
by the existing approaches. First, consider the majority approach, which 
scholars, judges, lawyers, and other commentators have heavily criticized 
for many years.169 Under the majority approach, the third-party defendant, 
the only party that was not a part of the statutory workers’ compensation 
arrangement, bears the burden of inequity created by the workers’ 
compensation bargain.170 Additionally, this approach “potentially leaves the 
third-party defendant bearing more than its actual share of the loss in a state 
that is supposed to apportion liability in accordance with fault.”171 Another 
noteworthy problem is that the majority approach can be confusing to 
juries, particularly when the third-party defendant offers convincing 
evidence of the employer’s fault at trial in attempt to establish that the 
employer was the cause of the employee’s injury, as the defendant is 
permitted to do. If it is clear that both the employer and the third-party 
defendant are each an actual cause of the injury, the jury is then instructed 
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that fault can only be apportioned between the defendant and the plaintiff, 
potentially leading juries to attempt to manipulate a “fair” result.172 
In contrast, the new approach avoids placing the entire burden of 
inequity created by the workers’ compensation bargain on the third-party 
defendant by instead requiring the injured employee and the employer to 
share in the risk. Also, rather than removing the issue of the employer’s 
liability from the jury, the new approach allows the jury to allocate fault to 
the employer. This also eliminates the jury manipulation problem because 
the calculations would be conducted by the court after the jury allocates 
fault to the parties. 
Next, consider the California-North Carolina approach, which 
several states have presumably adopted in attempt to alleviate the harsh 
results achieved by the majority approach. Although this approach purports 
to achieve a similar outcome as limited contribution but by avoiding the 
complicated motion process, the California-North Carolina approach has 
come to be known as a complex one that requires involvement of all three 
parties and that leaves courts struggling to decide multifaceted problems on 
a case-by-case basis.173 It also leaves too much room for manipulation of 
the outcome by the parties through settlement.174 For these reasons, several 
jurisdictions have deliberately declined to follow this approach.175 
Conversely, by eliminating subrogation claims by the employer 
when it or an employee is found to be partially at fault, the new approach 
ensures that the damage suit will only involve the injured employee and the 
third-party defendant. Because the employer’s interests are not affected by 
the outcome of the suit, the employer is unlikely to involve itself in the 
proceedings. In addition, in states where an employer is prevented from 
exercising its subrogation right against injured employee’s settlement with 
a third party, the problem of the employee attempting to manipulate the 
result through settlement is avoided. Under the new approach, there would 
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not be an added incentive for the injured employee to settle with the third-
party defendant, as in the California-North Carolina approach, because the 
subsequent reimbursement of the employer would not be an issue. 
Finally, the New York approach, which allows the third-party 
defendant to seek contribution against the employer, has been criticized for 
swinging too far in the other direction, creating an inequitable result for the 
employer (or the employer’s insurance carrier).176 Under this approach, the 
employer does not receive limited liability, the benefit of its bargain with 
the injured employee. While principles of comparative fault are observed, 
this approach ignores the policies behind the exclusive remedy provision of 
its workers’ compensation laws, though now this only occurs when there is 
a “grave injury.” Minnesota’s approach, in seeking to improve upon New 
York’s rule by capping the employer’s liability up to the amount of 
workers’ compensation benefits, did so at the expense of aligning each 
party’s liability with its percentage of fault.177 The Minnesota approach can 
still result in unfairness to the third-party defendant, especially when the 
employer (or coworker) is largely to blame for the employee’s injury.178 
The Minnesota approach addresses the New York approach’s 
failure to grant the employer limited liability, the most obvious problem 
with that approach. However, the Minnesota approach does not address the 
fact that the New York approach does not apportion liability among the 
parties. In contrast, the new approach addresses both of these problems, 
recognizing the employer’s limited liability while still requiring the jury to 
allocate fault to the employer. 
It is worth noting that each of the existing approaches protects the 
injured employee’s interest in full recovery at the expense of the interests of 
the third-party defendant, the employer, or both. Interestingly, no state 
approach forces the injured employee to bear the risk of under-
compensation in its suit against a third-party defendant, when “this is the 
same sort of undercompensation that an employee would face without the 
fortuity of having a third-party defendant in the case.”179 The proposed 
solution seeks to address this problem by spreading the burden of potential 
inequity among all three parties involved. This risk of under-compensation 
on the part of the plaintiff, or injured employee, and the risk of paying in 
excess of fault on the part of the employer can be justified as being a part of 
the quid pro quo of the limited liability workers’ compensation bargain. 
Placing the entire burden of inequity on the third-party defendant, who was 
not a party to the workers’ compensation bargain, is clearly not the fairest 
solution; however, it is a fundamental concept of tort law that the defendant 
must take the plaintiff as he finds him. Therefore, placing some of the risk 
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on the third-party defendant that he will have to pay heightened damages 
due to the vulnerability of the particular plaintiff is not unjustified. 
In addition to addressing the problems with the existing 
approaches, the new approach also seeks to improve upon the various 
solutions suggested by scholars. Each of the suggested solutions discussed 
herein raise the issue of either over-simplifying or further complicating this 
complex dilemma. The elimination of third-party lawsuits, the most over-
simplified option, would require a dramatic increase in the benefits 
provided to injured employees from employers or other sources,180 and such 
a development appears impractical and unlikely. Similarly uncomplicated is 
the concept of separating the workers’ compensation and tort systems 
entirely by reducing the third-party defendant’s liability in proportion to his 
share of fault and eliminating the employer’s subrogation right. But, this 
suggested solution places the full burden of inequity on the injured 
employee, running the risk of severe undercompensation. Also, under this 
complete separation approach, the burden of defending the employer’s 
conduct against the third-party defendant would completely fall on the 
employee because the employer would have no real stake in the 
litigation.181 
The new approach improves upon these simplified solutions by 
providing a solution that merely requires courts and juries to allocate fault, 
a task that courts regularly engage in, rather than requiring a dramatic 
change in workers’ compensation schemes. Additionally, the new approach 
does not require the injured employee alone to bear the risk of inequity but 
allocates the risk among all the parties. Although, under the new approach, 
the injured employee would bear the burden of defending the employer’s 
conduct in the damage suit, this problem is largely neutralized by the 
automatic reduction of the damage award in the amount of workers’ 
compensation benefits and by the equal division of any portion of the total 
damage award not attributed to the third-party defendant’s fault. 
It is most concerning that several solutions suggested by scholars 
still fail to require allocation of fault to the employer in an injured 
employee’s damage suit, while the principles of several liability and 
comparative fault effectively compel consideration of the employer’s level 
of fault.182 Without considering the employer’s fault, it seems that it would 
be nearly impossible for a jury to assign an exact percentage of 
responsibility to the third-party defendant or, for that matter, the injured 
employee.183 Nevertheless, the “Murray Credit” rule and Professor Larson’s 
approach both avoid fault allocation to the employer, instead opting to 
automatically reduce the damage award by half or by the amount of 
workers’ compensation benefits, respectively. Under the Murray Credit 
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rule, the injured employee is likely to come out undercompensated due to 
the extreme reduction to the award and the employer’s right to subrogation. 
Professor Larson’s approach somewhat addresses this problem by only 
reducing the award according the benefits actually paid by the employer 
and by eliminating the employer’s subrogation right. But, under both 
approaches, liability will rarely reflect the fault of the parties. 
The new approach, however, improves upon these suggested 
solutions by requiring a fault allocation between all of the parties from the 
outset. Although in many cases the ultimate liability born by the employer 
and the third-party defendant would not likely be precisely in proportion to 
their respective fault, the approach does not favor any one party. As 
discussed, depending on the circumstances, either the injured employee, the 
immune employer, or the third-party defendant may be forced to accept a 
seemingly inequitable result. 
Professor Davis’s proposal and Professor Klein’s proposal do in 
fact involve allocation of fault, including that of the employer. While 
Professor Klein’s proposal only uses the employer’s percentage of fault to 
reduce the damage award, Professor Davis’s proposal also uses the 
percentage to calculate the amount the employer is permitted to recover 
from the injured employee through subrogation. But, because Professor 
Davis’s proposal makes the amount an employer can recover in subrogation 
dependent on the fault allocation, the employer has a greater stake in the 
litigation. Therefore, if this proposal was adopted, it would likely result in 
the same complications that have arisen under the California-North 
Carolina approach. Professor Klein’s proposal, on the other hand, seems to 
be a reasonable solution, but it is unclear how this approach is different, in 
effect, from the complete separation approach. Under both approaches, the 
damage award is calculated in proportion to the third-party defendant’s 
fault and the right to subrogation is eliminated. The only difference seems 
to be that Professor Klein conceptualizes the workers’ compensation 
payment as a settlement. 
The new approach is undoubtedly similar to Professor Davis’s 
proposal and Professor Klein’s proposal in that it begins with requiring 
fault allocation among the parties and reduces the damage award to reflect 
the third-party defendant’s percentage of fault, but it is the new approach’s 
departure from these previous proposals that provides the improvement. 
The new approach, unlike Professor Davis’s approach, eliminates 
subrogation, ensuring that the employer does not become involved and 
complicate the damage suit. Also, assuming that the damage award will not 
fully compensate the injured employee after being reduced by the amount 
of workers’ compensation benefits and by the percentage of the employer’s 
fault, the new approach does not require the employee alone to bear the full 
loss, as Professor Klein’s proposal would. Instead, the loss is divided 
equally between the injured employee and the third-party defendant, 
ensuring that each bears the burden of inequity. 
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CONCLUSION 
Thus, we must conclude on the realistic note that there is no perfect 
solution for this “most evenly balanced controversy.” Courts, legislatures, 
and scholars have grappled with this problem of how to treat the concurrent 
negligence of the employer in the plaintiff’s suit against a third-party 
defendant for decades. Endless amounts of research lead to the frustrating 
result that it is practically impossible to fully account for all of the interests 
involved. However, one thing is sure: under the majority approach, 
unfairness to the third-party defendant is obvious. The defendant is held 
liable for the full amount of harm, even if his relative percentage of fault 
was small, and meanwhile, the negligent employer benefits from avoiding 
tort responsibility and retains the right to recover its workers’ compensation 
payments through subrogation. This result has become even less justifiable 
considering the emergence of comparative fault principles designed to align 
liability with fault. 
The author’s proposed solution is not a perfect one. Depending on 
the facts of the particular case, the interests of at least one of the three 
parties will, in part, be ignored. The plaintiff will not always be fully 
compensated for his injury, and either the third-party defendant or the 
employer will likely be forced to pay in excess of its relative percentage of 
fault. The purpose of the solution is to, as equally as possible, spread the 
risk of being burdened with inequity among the parties. The new solution 
accomplishes that aim by eliminating the employer’s subrogation right 
when it is determined to be partially at fault, reducing the damage verdict 
by the workers’ compensation benefits paid and in proportion to the third-
party defendant’s fault, and then dividing any portion of the total damage 
verdict that remains unaccounted for between the plaintiff and the third-
party defendant. Therefore, the solution simultaneously respects the 
essential components of both tort law and workers’ compensation. 
 
